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asm for the future social organism, such as might be shared by any atheistic socialist?

Thus after all, our author has not been able to move out of the magic circle of the subjective. The great Platonic idea of the community — what is it but the epitome of the needs of man, such as all pragmatists desire? No objective principles or ideals except this are mentioned; almost all of the book is concerned with epistemological controversy. Yet though he does not specify them, it is a good sign that he hints of ideals to be followed in the making of the perfect society, that he would right the over-balanced cultivation of activity, and that he defends, if in little more than name, the fundamental importance of religion for human progress.

Dr. Adams' diction is rather obscure, and his paragraphs as a rule lack unity. A Platonist should not use nouns as adjectives: e.g., "idea system," "knowledge situation," "behavior interest," etc. Nor should he employ the barbarous "due to" when he means "on account of" (p. 29). Examples, too long to quote here, of English which is no less than slovenly, are found on pp. 44, 59, 113, 166, 229.

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THE RELIGION OF NIETZSCHE. NIETZSCHE THE THINKER. A STUDY. WILLIAM MACKINTIRE SALTER. Henry Holt & Co. 1917. Pp. x, 539. \$3.50.

The key to Nietzsche's theory of life, Mr. Salter thinks, is the conflict in his mind between piety and knowledge. "Being by nature and by force of early training reverent, finding, however, his religious faith undermined by science and by critical reflection, his problem came to be, how, consistently with science and the stern facts of life and the world, the old instincts of reverence might still have measurable satisfaction, and life again be lit up with a sense of transcendent things. He was at bottom a religious philosopher."

This observation, though not new, has never before been so clearly put, and with such a nice sense of the fact that whatever system and poise Nietzsche in thought attained rests upon a conflict of emotions that grew deeper and more tragic with the years. Neither of these facts seems, to most commentators upon Nietzsche, to have been of particular importance. They respond to his emotional qualities — the beat and rhythm of his style, the great hunger and dream-like gratifications in his ideas. They violently agree with him or they violently disagree with him, according as he lifts the lid or clamps it

down upon their own subterranean reserves of feeling; they preach him or they denounce him; they do everything but understand him. The fault is not altogether their own. Nietzsche's temperament, method, and style are not such as to evoke understanding. He is the most personal, the most autobiographical and idiosyncratic of the great thinkers of the nineteenth century. His work is more frequently a soliloquy and a challenge than an analysis and an exposition, and his effect upon his readers corresponds. To understand him requires an impersonality, a scientific self-restraint, difficult indeed for those who are in the least sensitive to the subtle and infectious quality of Nietzsche's *élan*. Yet this is very nearly what Mr. Salter has attained. He has written an exposition of Nietzsche's thought without parallel in English, without parallel perhaps in any language, for impartiality, lucidity, and detail. He has done this by attending objectively to the thought of Nietzsche, without obtruding his own reaction upon it. He has classified, arranged, coördinated. Not a remote whimsey in the collection of apothegms and reflections which so largely make up Nietzsche's works but he has studied, appraised, and set under its appropriate concept, not a nuance that he has not caught and fixed.

Withal, the defects of his method can not be separated from its excellences. Intent upon the last things, the endings, dyings-out, realizations, which all thoughts are, of Nietzsche's mental processes, he sets them in the order of their logic and mutual implications which is appropriate to thought. He provides an architectonic of Nietzsche's mind, the most admirable yet to hand. But he does not provide, nor with his method can he provide, the explanation of Nietzsche's mind which his excellent beginning leads the reader to hope for. Very probably he did not intend to do so. Yet the comprehension of Nietzsche involves very much more than the exposition of him, and in a mind like his, thoughts and feelings are so inextricably interwoven that the gain from a genetic approach can hardly be estimated. Behind Nietzsche's thought, motivating and finding self-fulfillment in it, lie not only the conflict of his temperamental and nurtural piety with his mature knowledge, but the whole aggregate of conflicts that made up his diathesis. The entire history of his life is one of disease, of pain, of unremitting strain of body and mind and of the struggle to conquer them. His change in attitude toward existence and its conditions, his break with the Schopenhaurian system, with Wagner, his bitter denunciations of the great mass-movements of his own time, are all implicated in the alterations of his attitude toward his own existence and his own problem. That absorbed him, as it must have absorbed any man, and its heart and vitals were the mastery of pain.

It is this that makes of Nietzsche a religious philosopher, even though — indeed through the very act — he stands what is customarily called religion on its head. But if he stands it on its head, it is not because he differs with the tradition regarding its ultimate end. He agrees regarding its ultimate end. He differs with regard to its tools and means. For Nietzsche is no cosmological philosopher. He is not concerned with analyzing the world into its elements, with understanding its nature and laws. He has no scientific curiosity, and his spirit is one of assertion, not of inquiry. He is bitterly and tragically concerned with that wherewith all religionists more smugly concern themselves. He is concerned with Salvation, and his system, no less than the Christian system, is a system of Salvation. But where Christianity saves *from* sin and pain and evil, Nietzscheanism saves *in* sin and pain and evil. His system is postulated on making his weakness his strength, on the power of self-mastery, self-transcendence, through self-affirmation. Now escape from self is the aim of all religions of disillusion, whether Asiatic or European. But the escape is a self-negation, a suicide, not a self-affirmation. It is escape through denial. In his early philosophizing Nietzsche accepted this way of escape. Indeed, he experienced it in his own life, and he got corroboration of it from his classical studies and his philosophical discipleship. He followed Schopenhauer and Schopenhauer taught the will and the self-destruction of the will in idea, particularly in idea as art and as religion. In these the will comes to rest from its unhappy strain and turmoil of existence; in these it loses itself in the quietude of non-existence. And such non-existence is the goal of being. Hence man's discipline, Schopenhauer deduced, should be one of relaxation in the struggle for life, of self-surrender, and thus of self-transcendence and salvation. Unreligious though this doctrine seemed, it breathed the esoteric spirit of Christianity, and for a time Nietzsche found repose in it. But for a time only. The pain which opposed itself like a charged wire fence against his every impulse, shut him in and kept him prisoner. His every effort to get beyond it intensified it, and his every labor was not merely an achievement in itself but a mastery over pain. His life, in a word, was not an escape from and assuagement of pain, but an increase and a wrestling with it, like Israel's with the Lord. Such growth as he had attained, came in pain and through pain, and after a time he came to see it as the sole condition of life and achievement, came indeed to have something of a masochistic preference for it, and to see salvation not beyond it but within it.

This realization was of course primarily emotional, not intellectual. But it got rationalized, inasmuch as his feeling sucked into its vortex the substance of all the knowledge which his mind touched, and made of it an aid and a comfort. The knowledge was derived particularly from the world of classical philology and, in a much less degree, from evolutionary science. The modern industrial and economic world he could neither apprehend nor appreciate, and he had a certain emotional blindness to its implications which rendered it irrelevant to him. Indeed, there has rarely been a man of so profound and widespread an influence with so complete an obliviousness to the realities of his time.

But the very emotional blindness which rendered him oblivious on the one side, made him acutely perceptive and original on many others. It enabled his "transvaluation of all values," his postulation of the Superman, his vivid and biting analysis of the "decadence" of Europe. Truth disappeared for him; knowledge became a matter of "vital lies"; morality a question of continental health or of the lack of it; the history of philosophy the history of a misunderstanding of the body; salvation ceased to be vicarious and became a process of painful, self-affirming self-transcendence, ending in an unknown goal — the Superman — and the unknown goal became a substitute for the known God. God, for Nietzsche, died, and his own life became that of an agonist, if we may trust Andreas Salomé, of "emotion over the death of God." The good of life was to be found in an inversion of all things the dead God had been the symbol of — in the repudiation of society, of "morality," of all that relaxation of danger and vigilance which had turned men into a herd and God into a shepherd. Whereas men had anciently been lords, and God an ideal of isolated Epicurean autonomy and self-sufficiency, they are today weaklings and slaves and God is an indulgent master. The future yearns to something deeper, more vital, more tragic, and altogether unprevisable; not the serene divinity of the ancients, but the agonized divinity of the unborn. Says Zarathustra, "Once when men looked on the far-stretching sea, they said God; but I teach you to say, Superman." And since he taught the Superman, who is salvation, he taught also the life which attains to salvation. That life is tragedy and transition. Man is no resting-place but a bridge; as the ape is to man, a reproach and a burning shame, so man is to the Superman. The true duty of man, the right morality, is a duty and morality of pain and struggle, of self-transcendence by pain, of power by self-transcendence. Against the "decadent" and "slavish" "Love thy neighbor as thyself," Nietzsche sets the power-generating "Destroy thyself and the neigh-

bor as thyself," so that the unknown Superman, better than both, may come to be.

That this is an idealism without precedent or parallel can hardly be denied. Nor can it be denied that it is a religious idealism, having its source in the same motives and conditions, autobiographical and social, which the more orthodox religious derive from and gratify. To a large extent it is a simple contradiction of tradition, amplified and given the semblance of reasonableness by a more or less relevant assemblage of observations from history and culture. To this extent it may be dismissed as an idiosyncratic instance of a type of thinking I have elsewhere had occasion to describe as compensatory—i. e., as the mind's projection in idea, in imagination, of a world or system that makes good the felt insufficiencies of reality; a compensation for the shortcomings of reality. And how Nietzsche's philosophy of self-sufficiency was compensatory to his dependent, invalid's life, he who runs may read. In another dimension, however, in the dimension of the dialectic of values, Nietzsche has brought a unique gift to the treasure house of philosophy. He has to some degree exemplified and has powerfully preached a doctrine that envisages an ignored great residue of human life. He has done this out of a love of excellence which led him to the joyous acceptance of the most arduous and cruel of its conditions; he has done this, seeking to spread a firmer pedestal for a perfection, devotion to which is the more remarkable in that it is the most transhuman and undefined perfection which human idealism records. Nietzsche's philosophy is thus a religious philosophy with a vengeance.

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NEW YORK.

THE IDEA OF IMMORTALITY, ITS DEVELOPMENT AND VALUE. The Baird Lecture. 1917. GEORGE GALLOWAY. T. & T. Clark, 1919. Pp. viii, 234.
 IMMORTALITY, AN ESSAY IN DISCOVERY, COÖRDINATING SCIENTIFIC, PSYCHICAL, AND BIBLICAL RESEARCH. B. H. STREETER and Others. The Macmillan Co. 1917. Pp. xiv, 380. \$2.25.
 THE FUTURE LIFE IN THE LIGHT OF MODERN INQUIRY. SAMUEL MCCOMB. Dodd, Mead & Co. 1919. Pp. xii, 240. \$1.50.

Of the many recent books on Immortality, testifying pathetically to the interest in the subject awakened by the tragedy of the war, Dr. Galloway's is the most deliberate, and is likely to prove of most enduring value. "On God and Godlike men we build our trust" is his unannounced text. Science reveals in the world a principle of organization, which, in man, philosophy recognizes as the soul, al-